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As systems become increasingly software dependent, their
reliability will accordingly depend more so on the reliability
of their resident software. Just as techniques and processes
were developed and improved to ensure hardware reliability, so
must techniques evolve to ensure software reliability.
Two questions are addressed by this thesis. First, how do
we measure software reliability throughout a project's
lifecycle? Second, is there a tool which will provide
effective insight into the test-now-or-later problem?
The solution to our first question is a U.S. Army software
procurement methodology which is briefly outlined as the
overall framework for software procurement in this thesis.
The solution to our second problem is the primary focus of
this thesis. A software fault analysis tool is developed and
programmed. Some results from this algorithm are provided and
their potential resource saving impact explored.
Program managers of software-intensive projects would be
well advised to use the Army's methodology and this fault





The reader is cautioned that computer programs developed
in this research may not have been exercised for all cases of
interest. While effort has been made, within the time
available, to ensure that the programs are free of
computational and logic errors, they cannot be considered
validated. Any application of these programs without
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I . INTRODUCTION
As the Department of Defense progresses through the end of
the twentieth century and into a new and very uncertain
twenty-first century, one area can be considered a near
certainty: system reliability will become increasingly
dependent on software execution. Today many systems (Patriot
anti-missile, Space Shuttle, weapons' guidance, and aircraft
control systems among others) are being deployed which depend
extensively on correct software execution in order to achieve
desirable and intended overall system task execution.
Successful task execution is essential for overall mission
success and goal achievement; misperformance of even a simple
computing task can result in total mission failure. Mission
failure could certainly mean returning to base because of a
weapon's guidance error, without destroying a single target,
or it could mean failing to destroy an incoming ballistic
missile, as a result of an imperceptible guidance error, with
disastrous consequences. Such outcomes are unacceptable, and
quite fortunately, occur very infrequently.
Experience with modern systems during Operations Desert
Shield and Desert Storm indicates that the Department of
Defense system procurement policies generally produce systems
of acceptable quality and suitability. Suitability is a clan
of system properties that includes reliability, defined to be
the probability that the system performs its mission without
functional failure. Since modern weapons, such as missiles,
depend upon electronic sensors and information-processing
components to carry out their mission, reliability of the
sophisticated electronics and its software is essential to
achieve mission success.
To produce highly reliable products many system tests,
analyses, and simulations are typically conducted before
release is granted to actual operators. This extensive
process consumes many procurement resources (man-hours,
platform availability hours, and dollars) . Errors, resulting
from faulty design, inadequate simulation, and premature
system test during the procurement process result in the waste
of valuable resources. In the light of nearly guaranteed
reductions in procurement resource availability in years to
come, and the ever-increasing dependency of systems on
software for task execution, the Department of Defense must
strive to procure and test systems economically and in minimal
time
.
Managing the procurement process is no simple task, and
there are gray-areas in which mistakes will often be made.
However, a tool, or tools, which potentially reduces the
number of these gray-area mistakes will certainly reduce the
consumption of procurement resources. This reduction in
resource consumption by individual projects, accompanied by a
constant or increased level of system reliability and
performance, becomes the procurement manager's goal.
This thesis will address an approach to assist in
achieving the procurement manager's goal that uses software
metrics as statistical indicators of the attained level of
software reliability of a system. A manager responsible for
procurement and acceptance of software intensive systems is
well-advised to use these metrics to help make critical test-
now-or-later decisions. The guidance offered may result in
significant resource savings if it leads to appropriately
postponing a prematurely scheduled test, one highly likely to
lead to early termination without obtaining useful results,
but which, nevertheless, consumes many man-hours, much
platform time, and many dollars. A well-supported decision as
to when software intensive systems are ready for operational
test potentially saves both project time and money.
In the next two sections a two-part software reliability
problem will be described. The overall problem of improving
the software procurement process and the subset problem of
gray-area test-now-or-later decisions will be included. In
Chapter II, a metrics-supported solution will be presented to
address the overall problem. In Chapter III, a specific fault
analysis model will be described to address the gray-area
decision problem. In Chapter IV, two sets of software fault
data are analyzed using an algorithm which represents the
fault analysis model from Chapter III. In Chapter V,
conclusions and recommendations are presented. The appendices
include: details about 12 base software metrics from Chapter
II, the algorithm based on the Chapter III fault analysis
model, and an additional fault-analysis model which is
slightly different from the one in Chapter III.
A. PROBLEM BACKGROUND
Since approximately 1970, software reliability has
steadily emerged as a primary area of interest for procurement
agencies tasked with purchasing software-intensive systems.
Both civilian and Department of Defense procurement agencies
acquire software-intensive systems regularly.
In modern times measurement techniques have been developed
and integrated into the hardware acquisition process. For
example, an M-16 semi-automatic assault rifle goes through an
extensive process of measurement and re-measurement in order
to confidently ascertain that a very reliable weapon is
delivered to the soldier in the field.
At present, many hardware items depend in an important way
on sister software units for information processing and
guidance to comply with documented requirements. Such
dependency upon software can be anticipated to increase over
time. For example, the software interface and control for a
Vulcan Phalanx anti-air defense cannon is one such sister
software unit, the failure of which can result in catastrophic
system failure, or, at the very least, in considerable
inconvenience
.
B. THE TWO-PART PROBLEM
The assessment of software reliability, while consuming
minimal procurement resources, becomes the overall problem
addressed by this thesis. A software metric or measurement
process is provided in Chapter II to address this overall
software reliability problem. Over time, progress has been
made in developing software performance measurement techniques
that are increasingly cost-effective. These techniques are
still in their infancy, yet do, and have, frequently achieved
their objectives.
An example of this progress in civilian-sector practice is
the current process of software performance measurement
practiced at IBM, Houston, for the Space Shuttle's primary
avionics software (Keller, 1992). The measurement tool used
at IBM is a Schneidewind non-homogeneous Poisson fault
analysis model (Farr, 1991, Schneidewind, 1992). The
objective of this IBM measurement tool is to predict the
probability of encountering a serious primary software error
during onboard processing on the next Shuttle mission. This
objective falls squarely in line with the overall Shuttle
project manager's goal of preventing any such failures. Thus,
with this measurement tool the Shuttle project manager could
reasonably expect to make appropriate decisions concerning the
level and extent of ground testing, which would directly
result in resource savings.
To illustrate our second problem concerning gray-area
decision mistakes and their ramifications in defense
acquisition, a potential scenario (U.S. Navy-specific) is
appropriate. Suppose that an anti-air, surface-launched
missile system depends heavily on its resident software to
receive, interpret and execute all applicable sensor,
operator, and system inputs. Suppose this missile system's
program manager, without software metric information, feels
that an operational system test is now warranted for this
missile system. In conjunction with COMOPTEVFOR (Commander,
Operational Test and Evaluation Forces) , the missile system is
readied for test. So, with a warm feeling about the missile
system, the project manager pushes the system through to this
operational testing phase, very possibly a marginally-
justifiable or gray-area decision. At this point, during the
OP-test, a severe software fault could result in significant
resource losses (e.g., many man-hours, much platform time, and
monies). To reduce the probability of this resource-wasting
scenario occurring, a fault-analysis model is provided in
Chapter III as a specific tool to potentially reduce the
number of these gray-area mistakes. As part of the overall
software reliability process proposed in Chapter II, a
predictive software fault analysis is developed in this thesis
to address this second problem. Previous research, entitled
Fitting and Prediction Uncertainty for a Software Reliability
Model (Dennison, 1992), has been undertaken. In this previous
study a Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) model was
presented and analyzed. This thesis will develop a
generalized version of this previous work which utilizes a
different likelihood approximation which allows for varying
software execution times covering separate operating periods
(i.e., weekly, daily, etc.). This generalized version
supports data akin to most real-world periodic data collection
techniques
.
Our problem then has been presented in two parts. Stated
as questions: first, is there an approach whereby software
reliability can be increased to operationally acceptable
levels throughout the procurement process, and second, prior
to the operational test phase, can we use a specific tool to
predict the propensity for errors to occur in the near future
for our software-intensive system? Solutions to these
problems will be addressed in the next few chapters.
In Chapter III, a software-metrics approach will be
introduced and discussed as a positive solution to our first
problem. Also, a metric quality assurance (e.g., appropriate
metric selection) question will be raised and discussed.
II. A METRIC SOLUTION FOR SOFTWARE MANAGEMENT
The Department of the Army has put together an extensive
software development guidance package draft entitled Software
Test and Evaluation Procedures and Guidelines
,
(Draft
Software, 1992) . In this document, a process to economically
procure defense software is thoroughly addressed. The basis
for this effective process is continuous evaluation.
"Decision-making must be based upon substantive evaluations of
software characteristics, maturity, and reliability indicators
throughout the lifecycle" (Army, 1-5, 1992). With this goal
the Army plan uses software metrics, which are defined as "a
quantitative value, procedure, methodology, and/or technique
which allows one the ability to measure various aspects and
characteristics of software," (Army, Glossary-5, 1992) to
quantify software characteristics so that a program manager
can indeed make decisions based on the metric information
which will either save procurement resources, produce more
capable systems, or both.
This draft process directly addresses our first and
overall software reliability problem. A group of 12 primary
software metrics form the building blocks for the Army's
proposed metric analysis for software-intensive systems.
These 12 metrics are outlined in Appendix A and briefly
discussed in this chapter. The Department of the Army also
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places each of these 12 metrics into one of three categories;
management, requirements or quality.
The management category includes four metrics: cost,
schedule, computer resource utilization and software
engineering environment . Cost is a tool to compare budgeted
versus actual costs as well as scheduled versus actual
progress. Schedule provides insight into milestone progress,
or lack thereof. Computer resource utilization is a tool to
track the degree of computer processing usage (e.g., computer
processing units, input processors, and memory registers).
The software engineering environment metric is a numerical
rating tool for any given contractor, based on evidence of
that contractor's historical adherence to certain software
engineering practices and procedures.
The requirements category contains both requirements
traceability and stability metrics. Traceability provides a
measure of contractor conformity to system requirements (e.g.,
the percentage of system requirements that are being met by
the software code) . Stability indicates how much change the
system requirements have exhibited because of software non-
conformity (e.g., the percentage of requirement changes from
the baseline initial project list of requirements)
.
Lastly, the quality category contains six software
metrics: design stability, complexity, breadth of testing,
depth of testing, fault profile, and reliability. Design
stability reflects the amount of change to software design
(e.g., percentage of the source line of code (SLOC) that is
affected by any implemented change to the software design)
.
Complexity supplies insight into the structure of the software
and includes measures, like the McCabe cyclomatic complexity
measure (McCabe, 1976) , to quantify the structure for any
software module. Breadth of testing indicates through
percentage conformity how well testing has covered the
functional requirements. Depth of testing helps indicate the
extent that executable paths within individual modules have
been exercised (e.g., percentage of the executable paths
utilized) . Fault profiles furnish insight into a contractor's
ability to correct known discrepancies, and provide rough
insight into software quality through fault correction
tendencies and fault occurrence tracking. Finally, the
reliability metric utilizes modeling techniques to make
predictions of future software readiness, meaning freedom from
faults during execution.
These 12 base metrics are each detailed further in
Appendix A. Example figures and applicable equations are also
included as part of the appendix.
To utilize these 12 metrics as an effective managerial
tool, a program manager would consider all available metric
information as a part of any milestone review process. Each
applicable metric can provide the additional information
necessary to help signal problems or progressions within the
software's development.
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At each milestone review the software-metric information
should be made available to all involved agencies. This
information-sharing policy would potentially lead to earlier
software problem identification which should in-turn result in
resource-saving decisions. For example, a significant
software inadequacy relating to contractor requirements
accomplishment would certainly be indicated in the software
requirements traceability and stability metrics information as
numerically low conformity percentages. This requirements
inadequacy would in all likelihood surface earlier in the
acquisition process given the software-metrics information.
This quantitative and often earlier problem recognition would
most certainly lead to timely managerial attention and
resulting resource savings. Thus, the metrics methodology
becomes a quantitative management tool for any software-
intensive program.
The 12 Army metrics form a base set of software metrics
within which deletions or additions may be appropriate. Many
other metrics exist which may or may not be appropriate for a
particular project (Siefert, 1989) . To start with this set of
12 metrics as the primary initial evaluation point becomes an
initial and basic goal for a project manager. From this
initial set, some metrics may be considered inapplicable and
consequently removed from consideration for inclusion in
project data requirements. Still others, outside the basic
12, may be incorporated into the list of applicable metrics,
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and be subsequently included in the project data requirements
list .
Given the Army metric plan, the selection and evaluation
of appropriate software metrics is no simple endeavor, but is
essential for obtaining useful quantitative information
throughout the project lifecycle. Guidance to choose suitable
software metrics would be beneficial as part of the software
metric selection and utilization process. The recently
approved and distributed IEEE Standard for a Software Quality
Metrics Methodology (IEEE, 1993), promises to be a useful tool
to aid in the evaluation and selection of an appropriate set
of software metrics. Direct guidance for software metric
validation is included as part of the process by which better
overall software quality is achieved.
Once a set of software metrics has been selected and
validated with respect to applicability to the system under
development, and has been included in system data
requirements, then, and only then, can a project manager
expect to successfully receive, analyze, apply, and profit by
information that he or she would obtain from the metrics
throughout a project's lifecycle. Better software decisions
(i.e., decisions that would lead to increased quality and
expedited operational deployment) should evolve from an
effectively managed software metric plan which would in turn
lead directly to resource savings.
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The software metric approach, when implemented as part of
the milestone review process, can become a crucial management
tool for all phases of software development. A prevalent
problem appears to stem from the propensity of program
managers to make premature resource-wasting decisions
concerning the progression of their projects through the
procurement process because of inadequacy of information
concerning the faults currently resident in their software.
The use of software metrics, after validation, should
positively influence this decision making process at every
stage of system procurement.
With the Army's process to address overall software
management guidance, our second and much more specific problem
can be addressed. This test-or-do-not-test decision problem
is one that a program manager in conjunction with the testing
agencies must make very often. A quantitative indicator which
provides insight into the propensity for software to encounter
future faults would be very valuable. With this obstacle in
mind, a predictive tool for just this purpose is described and
exercised in the next two chapters. The major impact of this
thesis stems from Bootstrapping (Efron, 1985) a NHPP model
(Goel, 1979) and a computer program that allows this
Bootstrapped model to be applied to real test data.
13
III. RELIABILITY MODEL DEVELOPMENT
A Non-Homogeneous Poisson Process (NHPP) software
reliability model is constructed using the following
assumptions
:
• Program test runs are conducted in non-overlapping
time intervals.
• The fault counts in each interval are independent.
• Each fault is corrected as it is detected.
• The fault detection rate is modeled as exponentially
decreasing over time.
• The faults each have the same severity.
• The faults are equally likely to be detected.
• Fault counts are recorded after like intervals of
calendar time (e.g. daily, weekly etc.).
The mathematical model (Goel, 1979) is simply
where the subscript i represents the ith run-time interval.
These i intervals need not be of the same time length nor
contain the same number of faults. They may represent the
total time a program is run on a day, week, etc. The fj term
is the number of faults that occur during period i ; t
i
is the
cumulative amount of program run time up to and including
14
interval i; and A,; is the mean fault parameter for interval i
The parameter X
t




In the present model X and (I are the overall NHPP system
parameters and are to be estimated using the data set. The
maximum likelihood method (Larson, 1982) is used to estimate
these parameters.
Ltt f |i|data)«n e "Xi
'-^P (4
2=1 r^ •
is the likelihood function. Taking the natural log and using
I to represent the total number of time intervals results in
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Substituting the expression for X
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Next, to find a maximum for this log-likelihood function take
the partial derivative of L(X, \l\ data) with respect to X to get
«_ I I faL
_ v^ /--n-t,., ~-M-t,\ . v^ ri (7)
QA 2=1 2 = 1 A
Sum out (7) to obtain
ig=(l-e -^) + (^), (8)
where f
+
is the cumulative number of faults for all periods i.





After replacing X in (6) with X from (9) take the derivative
of the log-likelihood (6) with respect to |i and set this equal
to zero, again to obtain a maximum likelihood estimate, to get
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To solve for (I in (10) an iterative procedure is used
First, executing the summation in (10) results in













Let x= (exp ( -(i- t
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Now, with (11) and (12) we observe that s=[x/(l-x)] and
alternately x=[s/(l+s)].
To begin the iterative process, x is set initially to
j- number of faults for last half of the run time -, 2 i^)
number of faults for first half of the run time
This rough initial x-value is obtained from observing that the
square of the fraction of the expected value of the numerator
divided by the expected value of the denominator is indeed a
potential x-value choice. This rough x-value need not be very
precise. The iterative process will refine it quickly. Now,
with x= (exp (
-|X-
1
: ) ) ,
solve for the first (X-value. Then with
this (X-value solve (12) to get s. We then obtain our next x-
value from x= [s/ (1+s) ] , which iteratively leads to a series of
fX-values that are eventually an accordingly small number,
epsilon equal to 10" 3 , apart. When this is achieved the most
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recent ^i-value becomes our model estimated parameter, p.. From
(9) we get our estimate for A, which is our other model
parameter, £,
.
With the estimates p. and X, obtained from the raw data, we
can now proceed with the Bootstrapping technique (Efron,
1985) . This procedure recognizes the variability of raw data,
and by re-sampling allows us to expand our analysis from a
point estimate ((!,£.) to confidence intervals.
First, using (3) and the estimates of X and (J. from the
original data, an estimated X
{
is computed for each interval
i. These X i ' s are then used to generate a new set of
synthetic observed data, denoted f^b), using a Poisson random
number generator (Fishman, p. 440, 1978) . Once this new data
set is available, a series of new estimates (1(b) and X,(b) are
obtained using the same procedures as above: (9) and (10).
This data regeneration and estimation procedure is repeated
200 times, giving ((1(b), X(b)) for b=l, 2, 3,..., 200; our
pairs of bootstrapped estimates.
The resulting set of 200 estimated parameter sets forms
the nucleus for our statistical analysis, to be described
below.
Suppose there is interest in estimating the expected
number of faults to occur in a run-time interval of duration
x following the current period, (e.g., after the total
observed run-time t
:
has elapsed) . In theory this is
18
m (t; tjik, |i) =* [tf( tx+x) -tf( tx ) ] =X-e-»
t
^-(l-e-^) . (14)
Now the maximum likelihood estimate (mle) of this mean
number of faults is obtained by substituting in the values of
the mle for the parameters A. and (I. Thus
filii; tx;X, \i) =m(x; tx;X, p) ^X-e^^-d-e'^) . (15)
Confidence limits can be placed on the mean number of
faults, and on the probability distribution of the number of
future faults, by using the bootstrapped parameter estimates
referred to earlier. Here is the procedure.
(a) Evaluate
fflib) =m{-z; tx;X(Jb) , (I (i)) ) where b=l, 2 , . . . ,B. (16)
Note that the bth bootstrap estimate occurs in the
estimated mean.
(b) Sort these values in increasing order:
iR^/ft^iftj-*. . . .<AB , (17)
where (fh)
d
is the jth ordered value of (fft (b) ) ,
b=l, 2, 3, . . ., B.
(c) Define j(<x) = [(XB]= smallest integer at least as large
as aB, where a- 100 is the desired percent confidence
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(e.g., a=0.95). Then quote the ordered value fftj(a)
as the approximate one-sided a- 100% confidence
limit for the mean number of faults in interval
(t I# t T +X) (e.g., with confidence a-100% the mean
number of faults in that interval is less than or
equal to mj(a) . For this thesis upper (a=0.95) and
lower (a=0.05) one-sided confidence intervals are
studied.
Because the distribution function of the Poisson is
specified by its mean we can state that with
confidence a-100% the probability that there will





in particular with confidence approximately a-100%
the probability of zero faults is exp ( -mj(a) ) .
These model results become one basis upon which the
program manager and the testing agency can help determine
whether a project's software is indeed mature enough to
support further testing or deployment.
If the precise inter-occurrence run-times are known then
a slightly different NHPP formulation for the maximum
likelihood estimates of X and (i, are required. These are
presented in Appendix C.
20
This NHPP model along with measured run-times and faults
recorded weekly or daily, etc., form the basis for a useable
prediction algorithm which is included as Appendix B. The
results obtained from using this algorithm on two separate
data sets are presented in Chapter IV.
21
IV. MODEL APPLICATION
Two available sets of data (COMOPTEVFOR, 1992) were used
to exercise the NHPP algorithm (Appendix B) . These two data
sets are provided in Tables 1 and 2 below. The data are
displayed as the amount of software execution time during each
week long period and the associated number of software faults
encountered during that same week. Notice that Data Set One's
execution times are recorded in minutes, and Data Set Two's in
hours
.
TABLE 1. DATA SET ONE












TABLE 2 . DATA SET TWO











For algorithm execution, the data sets above were entered
as cumulative execution times and cumulative fault counts.
Each of the two data sets contain ten data points
.
Starting with only the first five data points, two predictions
were made using the NHPP algorithm. First, a prediction
utilizing five data points over the next two weeks (i.e., end
of the seventh week) of software execution time was made.
Second, a prediction utilizing the same five data points over
all available data points (i.e., end of the tenth week) was
made. These, two week, and, end of data, predictions were
also calculated for six, seven, eight, and nine data points.
Results are provided in Tables 3 and 4 for Data Set One and in
Tables 5 and 6 for Data Set Two. Data in Tables 3, 4, 5, and
6 is for 95% one-sided confidence intervals.
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TABLE 3 . DATA SET ONE
TWO WEEK PREDICTIONS (NEAR TERM)
95% ONE-SIDED LOWER AND UPPER CONFIDENCE INTERVALS










95% LOWER 95% UPPER
5 47.21 16 5.02 11.93
6 76.70 15 13 .44 25.30
7 77.29 12 14.54 24.65
8 89.59 17 12.97 24.06
9 NA NA NA NA
TABLE 4 . DATA SET ONE
END OF DATA PREDICTIONS (LONG TERM)
9 5% ONE-SIDED LOWER AND UPPER CONFIDENCE INTERVALS










9 5% LOWER 95% UPPER
5 186.80 40 8.87 24.65
6 165.29 32 20.94 43.18
7 139.59 24 23.02 41.85
8 89.59 17 12.97 24.06
9 63.30 12 10.71 19.63
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TABLE 5 . DATA SET TWO
TWO WEEK PREDICTIONS (NEAR TERM)
95% ONE-SIDED LOWER AND UPPER CONFIDENCE INTERVALS











9 5% LOWER 95% UPPER
5 55 7 4.53 9.05
6 50 2 5.18 10.59
7 110 5 6.88 13.82
8 126 7 2.94 10.88
9 NA NA NA NA
TABLE 6 . DATA SET TWO
END OF DATA PREDICTIONS (LONG TERM)
95% ONE-SIDED LOWER AND UPPER CONFIDENCE INTERVALS










95% LOWER 95% UPPER
5 206 15 13.81 27.61
6 176 9 5.99 11.99
7 151 8 6.97 13.96
8 126 7 2.94 10.88
9 41 3 2.78 4.96
From Tables 3 through 6, one can see with both data sets
that as the number of data points available to the NHPP
algorithm increases, the mean fault confidence limits tend to
surround the actual fault counts more frequently. Also, for
predictions to the end of the data set, the lower and upper
confidence levels for Data Set One using only five data points
were much lower than the fault counts observed: there were 40
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actual faults, but the lower and upper confidence limits were
8.87 and 24.65, respectively. The discrepancy suggests the
importance of caution at this stage.
Other interesting observations include:
• Four of ten short-term (i.e., two-week) predictions
bounded the actual number of faults experienced.
• Total run-time for Data Set One was just over four and
a half hours while Data Set Two had 416 total run-time
hours
.
• Data Set One had an overall fault rate of 15.85 faults
per hour (immature software) while Data Set Two had an
overall fault rate of 0.09 faults per hour (mature
software)
.
• One-sided upper and lower confidence limits are closer
to actual fault counts for Data Set Two than for Data
Set One.
To briefly illustrate the tabular results of Tables 3, 4,
5 and 6, Figure 1, for Data Set One, and Figure 2, for Data
Set Two, are provided. All figures produced in this thesis
were generated using GRAFSTAT (GRAFSTAT, 1988), a commercial
statistical analysis tool. In these two figures nine weeks or
points of data were used with predictions provided over the
tenth week of software execution. These figures reflect the
nine data point results provided in the tables above. In
practice all data points would be used and predictions would
be calculated for a user-selected period of execution time
26
(e.g., the system software is required to operate for three
hours in the next test phase, so a three-hour predictive
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Figure 1 DATA SET ONE
Figure 1, from Data Set One, displays a lower one-sided 95%
confidence prediction of 10.71 mean faults and an upper one-
sided 95% confidence prediction of 19.63 mean faults. These
predictions were made for an additional execution time of 63.3
minutes which coincides with the amount of execution time in
the tenth week of data. There were 12 actual faults recorded
in this same period. Thus our predicted mean values bound the
actual number of faults recorded. A program manager, prior to
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week ten, using this model and algorithm could have predicted
that with 95% confidence this project's software would, on the
average, have no fewer than 10.71 faults or no more than 19.63
faults in the next 63.3 minutes of software execution time.
Additionally, with 90% confidence, this same manager could
predict that the mean number of faults to occur in the next
63.3 minutes of software run-time would be between 10.71 and
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Figure 2 DATA SET TWO
Figure 2, from Data Set Two, displays a lower one-
sided 95% confidence prediction of 2.78 mean faults and an
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upper one-sided 95% confidence prediction of 4.96 mean faults.
These predictions were made for an additional execution time
of 41 hours which coincides with the amount of execution time
in the tenth week of data. There were three actual faults
recorded in this same period. Thus our predicted mean values
bound the actual number of faults recorded. A program
manager, prior to week ten, using this model and algorithm
could have predicted that with 95% confidence this project's
software would, on the average, have no fewer than 2.78 faults
or no more than 4.96 faults in the next 41 hours of software
execution time. Additionally, with 90% confidence this same
manager could predict that the mean number of faults to occur
in the next 41 hours of software run-time would be between
2.78 and 4.96, accounting for the 5% upper and lower one-sided
confidence tails.
An additionally interesting prediction involves allowing
for a very long prediction interval, approaching infinity.
This prediction furnishes information about the number of
faults remaining in the software and is included as Table 7.
As expected from our NHPP model and plots of the data, many
faults are likely to remain for both software projects when
considering an infinite amount of software-execution time.
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TABLE 7 . BOTH DATA SETS
FAULTS REMAINING PREDICTIONS (PRESENT TO INFINITY)
95% ONE-SIDED LOWER AND UPPER CONFIDENCE INTERVALS




DATA SET ONE DATA SET TWO
95% LOWER 95% UPPER 9 5% LOWER 95% UPPER
5 108 667 95 241
6 151 856 80 232
7 396 815 110 302
8 119 264 140 407
9 153 295 89 159
All of the results obtained indicate that this NHPP tool
appears to be applicable to these data. Again, a rigorous
validation process is required to ensure that applicable
software metrics are selected for each individual software
project
.
In Chapter V, conclusions and recommendations concerning
the overall metric process and this specific NHPP reliability
model are presented.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of the results from Chapter IV, it becomes
apparent that a procurement agency would be well advised to
implement a software metrics methodology. The Army plan will
provide the overall structure to ensure that proper data is
collected, and analysis conducted, during a software-intensive
project's development and deployment.
Within the Army's software-metric methodology two other
actions must also occur. First, the metric information must
be made available to all involved agencies for analysis. One
agency may realize something another has missed. This
information sharing should result in an even greater resource
savings. Secondly, each metric must be rigorously validated
to ensure applicability within a project. Properly choosing
the set of software metrics is the first and perhaps most
important task in the resource saving metric process. Without
these two actions, an otherwise good metrics methodology will
perhaps not save as many procurement resources as it
potentially might.
For software, the CRLCMP (Computer Resources Life-Cycle
Management Plan)
,
provides the instrument for implementing
this metric process. Metric requirements and their inherent
data requirements should be included in this document. It is
recommended that the CRLCMP define clearly these metric and
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data collection requirements so that each software-intensive
project will, at inception, include adequate software metric
data collection and analysis requirements.
From the results in Chapter IV, several conclusions can be
drawn pertaining to the use of this NHPP algorithm.
First, and most importantly, a program manager could
certainly benefit from the information obtained through this
algorithm. For instance, from our data, after the sixth week
for either system, a manager trying to decide whether or not
to proceed with the next series of system tests, operational
or developmental, would most assuredly have been better
prepared to do so with the information calculated by this NHPP
algorithm. The NHPP algorithm's injection of information
quantifies the likely outcome of a test and its uncertainty as
support for a forthcoming decision.
Second, the NHPP algorithm gave predictive results which
frequently bounded the actual data results for both our
immature (Data Set One) and mature (Data Set Two) software-
intensive systems. These results suggest the applicability of
the NHPP algorithm to quantitatively express the maturity
(i.e., mature software contains relatively fewer faults) of a
software-intensive system at all phases of its development
(i.e., both early when systems are generally still immature,
and later when such systems are generally more mature)
.
Third, when considering the long-term predictive results
for either data set, a program manager could reasonably expect
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to gain substantial insight into a project's milestone
achievement potential. With this insight, a program manager
could potentially save valuable procurement resources by
making better decisions regarding software adjustments
throughout the project's lifecycle.
Fourth, as more data were used to predict the expected
mean number of faults in Chapter IV, the short-term predictive
information became more accurate and the difference between
the lower and upper 9 5% bounds became smaller. As data is
accumulated a program manager could expect to receive more
accurate short-term NHPP algorithm predictive results. This
increased accuracy could reasonably lead to even better
project software decisions.
Overall, this NHPP model with Bootstrapping can provide
accurate and timely information to a program manager. The
impact of this predictive model should result in better
management decisions which in turn should result in the saving
of valuable procurement resources. These savings would
certainly pay dividends in DOD's procurement process.
When exercising this NHPP model it is recommended that
SMERFS (Statistical Modeling and Estimation of Reliability
Functions for Software) (Farr, 1991), be also utilized to
provide alternate models for consideration and additional
statistical information. SMERFS is available as an off-the-
shelf product and is included as a reference in this thesis.
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Additional research would prove very valuable if
concentrated on each software metric, on the cost
effectiveness of metric data requirements, or on the impacts
of implemented software metrics methodologies throughout
civilian and government organizations.
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APPENDIX A
The set of 12 metrics as presented primarily in the
Department of the Army's draft Software Test and Evaluation
Procedures and Guidelines are summarized in this appendix.
Three basic categories of measurement are delineated in this
draft literature. Cost, schedule, computer resource
utilization and software engineering environment metrics are
included in a management category. Requirements traceability
and stability metrics define a requirements category. Design
stability, complexity, breadth of testing, depth of testing,




During a project life-cycle, software cost data should
continually be collected and analyzed. Indications of project
software well-being using this cost thermometer can be
expected.
Three areas require cumulative compilation. First, a
scheduled baseline of budgeted funds during each project must
be compiled (e.g., after 6 months the project software was
expected to achieve Milestone III, and 5 million dollars were
budgeted to reach this point) . Next, the budgeted funds to
reach actual project progress must be detailed (e.g., at 6
35
months the project is approaching Milestone III, and 4 million
dollars were budgeted to reach this point). Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the actual funds required to reach
the current project progress point must be revealed (e.g., at
6 months the project is approaching Milestone III, and 4.5
million dollars have been expended to achieve this).
Cost performance trends can be produced from these three
sources of data. Variability from expected, and therefore
budgeted, resource levels, as depicted in the cost (Figure 3)
and cost performance (Figure 4) figures below, will provide a
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Figure 4 COST PERFORMANCE
B . SCHEDULE
Adherence to a planned schedule of milestone achievement
can often not be accomplished. A schedule metric, when
properly utilized, can be used as an alarm device for further
investigative efforts by a software manager. Continual
milestone slippage may be indicative of software problems or
merely a poorly thought out schedule.
The planned month of milestone achievement should be
plotted versus the current program month (e.g., at actual
program month 9, Milestone IV was scheduled for completion in
program month twelve). A positively sloping line, Figure 5,
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C. COMPUTER RESOURCE UTILIZATION
The computer resource metric portrays the degree which
central processing unit capacity, memory/ storage capacity and
input /output capacity are changing or approaching the limits
of resource availability.
The central processing unit, each input /output channel,
random access memory and each mass storage device should be
monitored for utilization by tracking projected usage, actual
usage and target (upper bound) limits. Many off-the-shelf
software packages already self-monitor utilization parameters
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and some do not. In either case project software
specifications must include these data collection
requirements. The central processing unit capacity, Figure 6,
displays a possible utilization scenario. The software
manager will be able to better assess potentially critical
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Figure 6 RESOURCE UTILIZATION
D. SOFTWARE ENGINEERING ENVIRONMENT
Contractors for software projects are varied and many.
Each of these contractors operate their businesses in
different manners.
The software engineering environment metric is simply a
measurement of how government software contractor's
39
engineering practices compare to each other on a numeric
rating scale. The key assumption behind this rating metric is
that a quality engineering process results in a quality
software product.
The data required for this engineering environment metric
consists of questionnaire data and an actual assessment visit
by a qualified independent group. The information from these
assessments results in a numeric grade, from one to five, for
each software contractor.
This engineering environment metric would be supplied to
the software manager as yet another tool to help make




Contractual requirements for a software package are the
basis upon which development occurs. Users, administrators,
software managers and testers each take great care in
providing the strictest of guidance where system requirements
for contractors are specified. These requirements are
continually updated and improved upon.
A requirements traceability measure is essential to ensure
contractor adherence to specification and their continued
progress towards these requirements. This traceability
measure consists of a percentage conformity index which when
presented in matrix format at key milestone reviews can
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provide early indications of software problems. The
percentage of satisfied requirements from different sources
can provide this valuable information (e.g., 86% of user
requirements and 74% of the operational requirements have been
met at Milestone II) . Both forward and backward analysis of
these data become essential as requirements are added or
dropped with program maturity.
A software manager can better assess a contractor's
progress and possibly gain some preventive insight for the
future of the project by using these requirements traceability
indicators (e.g., are the user requirements acceptable?).
F. REQUIREMENTS STABILITY
As a software package progresses towards contractual
fulfillment, program managers may be forced to change any
number of requirements imposed upon a contractor (e.g., while
target information is being automatically updated there must
be an avenue available to manually alter the number of on-line
sensors) . A change in the contractual goal can often be a key
indicator for deeper system problems. This requirements
stability metric would track the number of engineering change
proposals, the percent source line of code changed and the
percentage of software modules affected by any change. Early
indications can be obtained, both good and bad, pertaining to
overall software well-being. A requirements stability
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Figure 7 REQUIREMENTS STABILITY
G. DESIGN STABILITY
The design stability metric is used to depict the amount
of changes made to the design of software. This metric should
be utilized throughout the life of a project. The stability
is defined by ( (M- (Fa+Fc+Fd) ) / M) and the design progress
ratio is defined by (M / T) . M is the number of modules
within the software. Fc is the number of modules that include
design related changes since the latest stability check. Fa
is the number of modules added since the latest stability
check. Fd is the number of modules deleted since the last
stability check. T is the number of modules projected for the
project. The design stability equation is simply a
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mathematical representation of the degree that software design
elements have to be changed as the project progresses.
H . COMPLEXITY
Complexity analysis is based on a single assumption; the
more complex the software, the harder it is to test and
maintain.
The McCabe cyclomatic complexity metric should be
collected and analyzed throughout a project's lifetime. Each
module should be analyzed with McCabe 's metric. The
complexity in McCabe's metric equals (E - N + 2P) , where E
equals the number of edges (e.g., software calls or branches
to procedures or functions), N equals the number of nodes
(e.g. software procedures or functions) and P equals the
number of stand alone components (e.g., within a module, no
branches between one set of nodes and any other)
.
An analysis of complexity for the overall software package
using McCabe analysis consists of counting all modules whose
complexity rating falls in a certain interval and displaying
these results for all modules. An example of this technique
is shown in Figure 8.
Other complexity measures like the Halstead approach are
available and thoroughly discussed in the Army's Software Test
and Evaluation Guidelines . As a result of diligent complexity
analysis, the program manager should gain insight into future
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I. BREADTH OF TESTING
The breadth metric details both how well a software
package demonstrates required functionality and how much
testing has been performed.
Three measurement ratios should be recorded and analyzed
throughout the lifetime of a project; test coverage which
equals the number of requirements tested over the total number
of requirements, test success which equals the number of
requirements passed over the number of requirements tested and
overall success which equals the number of requirements passed
44
over the total number of requirements. Figure 9 displays a
plausible breadth of test scenario.
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Figure 9 BREADTH OF TESTING
readily be made by a program manager with this breadth metric,
when analyzed in conjunction with other metrics.
J. DEPTH OF TESTING
The depth metric details the extent and success of testing
on a software intensive system. Many execution paths exist
within any software package. If the testing process is not
exploring a wide range of these executable paths, then
undisclosed difficulties may present themselves later in the
system lifecycle.
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Depth is comprised of three separate measurement ratios
(path, statement and domain) which are tracked for each module
in the system. The path ratio is the number of paths in a
module that have been successfully executed at least once over
the total number of paths in the module. The statement
measurement ratio is the number of executable statements in a
module that have been successfully executed at least once over
the total number of executable statements in the module. The
domain measurement ratio is simply the number of various input
combinations attempted over the total number of available
input instances. Figure 10 depicts a plausible depth of
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Figure 10 DEPTH OF TESTING
Automated (internal) data collection is necessary for the
path and statement ratios. To insure this automated process
is included in the software capabilities, these data




This metric is used to provide insight into software
quality and the contractor's ability to correct known faults
within the software. A simple plot of the cumulative number
of software trouble reports will reveal insight into the
























Figure 11 FAULT PROFILES
Next, a plot of fault age (i.e., time a fault remains non-
corrected or open) is a very useful fault profile tool, Figure
12.
L. RELIABILITY
Reliability in software has been studied from many
different angles and each of these angles have their own
positive points. Every software intensive project should
require a complete analysis when determining which reliability
technique(s) best fit a particular system. Reliability models
48
Figure 12 OPEN FAULT HISTOGRAM
can be used as predictive tools just as our model in Chapter
III. SMERFS is an example of a software reliability modeling
tool that could be utilized as an Army reliability metric.
The reliability metric consists primarily of fault analysis
models like the one developed in this thesis. With the use of
an applicable reliability fault model resource savings can be
expected as with any applicable software metric.
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APPENDIX B
In this appendix, the NHPP with independent time
interval lengths, discussed in Chapter III is represented in
an algorithm. This algorithm was used to generate the
results referred to in Chapter IV. The program was written in
Pascal for personal computer use and was executed utilizing
Turbo Pascal 6.0 (Borland, 1990), a commercial Pascal package.
PROGRAM SoftwareReliability (cumfail, output )
;
{Software Reliability}
{Software cumulative fault count analysis with bootstrapping}
{LT Doug Burton, USN}
{Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 93 943}
CONST epsilon = 1.0E-03;
LengthofDataSet = 10;
iteration = 200;
TYPE DATA = ARRAY [ .. LengthofDataSet ] of real;
RUNS = ARRAY [ .. iteration] of real;
VAR Faults, Times, FaultsEnd, LAMi, tempfaults :DATA;
lamboot ,muboot , lamprob,muprob, mean :RUNS;
XFirst,MU, LAMBDA, TotalTime, TotalFaults :real;
TotltFaults , A, B, key, Tother, percentile : real
;
i
, j , k, low, high : integer;
Cumfail :text;
{Faults = Number of system faults in each period}
{Times = Cumulative execution time for each period}
{FaultsEnd = Cumulative system faults for each period}
{LAMi = Set of Lambdas for each period}
{tempfaults = Temporary random fault counts in each period}
{lamboot = Lambdas generated from each bootstrapping run}
{muboot = MUs generated from each bootstrapping run}
{mean = Calculated means for each bootstrap iteration}
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{XFirst = Initial X value for EXP ( -MU*total system time)}
{MU = Model parameter}
{LAMBDA = Model Parameter}
{TotalTime = Total system execution time}
{TotalFaults = Total system faults encountered}
{TotltFaults = Total system faults for a bootstrap iteration}
{A and B = Dummy variables}
{key = Place holding variable}
{T = input variable for additional time analysis}
{other = a yes, no variable}
{percentile = user requested confidence percentile}
{i and j = Counters}
{low and high = The 5th and 95th percentiles}
{Cumfail = The cumulative data file being analyzed}
{****** ***FUNCTION TO DETERMINE THE FIRST X VALUE*********}
FUNCTION FirstXValue: real;
VAR SearchValue, FirstHalfCount , SecondHalfCount : real;
i : integer;
{SearchValue = Half of the total run time}
{FirstHalfCount = Faults in the first half of the run time}
{SecondHalfCount = Faults in the last half of the run time}










UNTIL (Times [i] >= SearchValue);
FirstHalfCount : = (FaultsEnd [i-1]
+
( (FaultsEnd[i] -FaultsEnd [i-1] )
*




FirstXValue := ( (SecondHalfCount /FirstHalfCount )
*
(SecondHalfCount /FirstHalfCount) ) ;
END; {FirstXValue}
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{ ***************PUNqTjqN Tq SOLVE FOR MU******************}
FUNCTION FindMU (XOne, TFaults :real; F :DATA) : real
;
VAR MUCurrent / MUNew / s,x, tl, t2, t3, t4 :real;
i : integer;
{MUCurrent = Last estimate for MU}
(MUNew = This estimate for MU}
{s and x = Iteration Values}














MUCurrent := ( ( (-1) *LN(XOne) ) /TotalTime)
;




FOR i : = 1 TO LengthofDataSet DO BEGIN
tl:=Times [i] *EXP( (-1) *MUCurrent*Times [i ] )
;
t2 :=Times [i-1] *EXP( (-1) *MUCurrent *Times [ i-1] )
;
t3 :=EXP( (-1) *MUCurrent*Times [i-1]
)
-EXP( (-1) *MUCurrent*Times [i] )
;
t4:=t4 + (F[i]* ( (tl-t2) /t3) ) ;
END; {FOR Loop}
IF (t4 < (0.01)) THEN t4:= 0.01;





MUNew := ( ( (-1) *LN(X) ) /TotalTime)
;






{********PROCEDURE TO GET LAMBDAS FOR EACH PERIOD*********}
PROCEDURE GenerateLambdas;
BEGIN
FOR i:= 2 TO LengthofDataSet DO BEGIN




LAMi [1] := (LAMBDA* ( 1-EXP ( -l*MU*Times [ 1 ] ) ) )
;
END; {Procedure GenerateLambdas}





FOR i:= 1 TO LengthofDataSet DO BEGIN




U : = RANDOM (1000)/1000;
WHILE (U>A) AND (A<=0.9999) AND (B>=0.0001) DO BEGIN
=X+1;
= (B*LAMi [i] ) /X;
= A+B;
END; {While}
temp faults [i] :=X;


















FOR i:= TO iteration DO BEGIN
lamboot [i] := ;
muboot [ i ] : = ;
mean [ i ] : = ;
END; {FOR Loop}
FOR i:= TO LengthofDataSet DO BEGIN
Times [i] := 0;
Faults [i] := 0;
FaultsEnd[i] : = ;
LAMi [ i ] : = ;
tempfaults [i] : = 0;
END; {FOR Loop}
r************* input THE DATA* ***************}
{Data comes from a data file listed next to the ASSIGN command
below.
}
{The data in this file must be in a two column format.}
{The first column will contain the cumulative system execution
times
.
{The second column will contain the cumulative system fault
counts that correspond to the times of column one.}
{Hard returns should be used to place the data into this
file.
}
{No column headers are necessary and will halt the program if
used.




WHILE NOT EOF (Cumfail) DO BEGIN
READLN (Cumfail, A # B) ;
Times [ j ] : = A;
FaultsEnd[ j ] : = B;
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END; {WHILE}
FOR i:= 1 TO LengthofDataSet DO BEGIN
Faults [i] :=FaultsEnd[i] -FaultsEnd [i-1]
;
END; {FOR Loop}
TotalTime:= Times [LengthofDataSet ]
;
TotalFaults := FaultsEnd [LengthofDataSet ]
;
^
******** *******Function and Procedure calls**************}
RANDOMIZE;
XFirst:= FirstXValue;
MU:= FindMU(XFirst, TotalFaults, Faults)
;








muboot [k] :=FindMU(XFirst, Tot It Faults, tempfaults)
;
lamboot [k] : = (TotltFaults/ (1-EXP( (-1) *muboot [k] *TotalTime) ) )
;
END; {FOR Loop}
low:= ROUND (iteration * (0.05));











'Please input the amount of time you want');
'to examine for faults in the future!');
'Any positive number will do.');
' CAUTION !!!');
'This amount of time MUST have the same' )
;
'time units as your original data');
'EXAMPLE--Data is in minutes therefore your');
'input is 2 0.5 "minutes".');







FOR i:= 1 TO iteration DO BEGIN
mean[i]:= lamboot [i]*
(EXP( (-1) *muboot [i] *Times [LengthofDataSet ] ) )
*
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(1-EXP( (-1) *muboot [i] *T) )
;
END;
FOR j:= 2 TO iteration DO BEGIN
key : = mean [ j ]
;
i:= (j-1);







Writeln( 'WITH 95% CONFIDENCE!');
Writeln('The maximum and minimum number of expected faults
in') ;
Writeln('the next ', T:3:3,' time units is');










Writeln ( 'e.g. Instead of 95%, you would like 98% bounds.');
Writeln;







IF (other=l) THEN BEGIN
Writeln (' Input your desired confidence percentile now.');
Writeln ('Use decimal format--e.g. 0.90 is your input for




low:= ROUND (iteration * ( 1-percentile) )
;
high:= ROUND ( iteration * percentile);
Writeln ( 'WITH '
,
(percentile*100 ) : 2 : 2 , ' % CONFIDENCE !') ;
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Writeln('The maximum and minimum number of expected faults
in
' ) ;
Writeln('the next ',T:3:3,' time units is');









Suppose that the precise inter-occurrence run-times of
failures are recorded: let t
x
be the time from the moment the
program begins running until the first fault is encountered;
tj_i is the cumulative run time until the (j-l)st fault;
tj=tj. 1+Xj, so Xj is the observed run time between the time of
occurrence of fault j-1 and fault j.
Given that the time to the (j-l)st fault discovery has
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and then
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j =1 , 2 , 3 , . . . ) represents the random inter-occurrence
time variables in our non-homogeneous Poisson process model.
Differentiation with respect to x gives the density
fj U;Tj . 1 )=\i-k'(e-
k -a
'^j '1^ 1 -°' ,t
'K) )-(e- ll
-T
^)-(e-^) . ( c - 3 >
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Now, if we observe Xj=Xj then the likelihood component becomes
f j (x D ; t j_! ) . Again, with tj representing our new cumulative









and taking the natural log of this likelihood function results
in
J J
L(k,\x\data)=J'lnk+J-ln\i+[-X'^ (e^'^-e" 11 ^) ] - [|i-V t^] .
J-l J=l
(C.5)
Differentiation with respect to X gives
-^ = ^Z"-V [e-^i-i-e-v**]
.
(C.6)
Setting the derivative equal to zero and solving gives
*- S . (CD
which resembles (9) in Chapter III, but is not the same since
the times differ.
Next, differentiation with respect to [i gives
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% =f- (XX t(t/e"'"t5)-(tJ.i-e"'"Vl>))-^ ^. (C.8)
If the above derivative is equated to zero an equation for
(X is obtained, once substitution of the expression for X in
terms of \i, as (9) in Chapter III, is carried out. An
iterative process for \i could use this formula:
Pn*l = - J
J=i
(C.9)
An iterative process for both X and p. would result in an
estimate for the model parameters \i and X. With these
estimates in hand, Bootstrapping can then be applied to
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